the un is a joke

the following was painstakingly coppied and pasted from the opinion journal, an online archive of wall street journal editorials...(which is a reputable publication, not an obscure loonie off in some corner of the internet...)
i especially enjoy the fact that attention is drawn not only to the un's ineptitude, but also its corruptness.



Crunch Time in Washington
The Iraq war is winnable, but not by the U.N.

Wednesday, April 14, 2004 12:01 a.m. EDT

A week of counterattacks by the U.S. military has improved security in Iraq, but we wish we could say the same about judgment in Washington. All sorts of people are drawing the wrong lessons from the surge of violence, enough so that the war could still be won on the ground in Iraq but lost in Georgetown and the East Side of Manhattan.

The most important lesson of the past 10 days is that the assaults in Sunni Fallujah and parts of the Shiite south do not represent a broad national uprising against the coalition. If they ever do--if most Iraqis really don't want us there--then the U.S. would have no choice but to leave. But most Shiites haven't joined Moqtada al-Sadr's call for revolt, and his Mahdi Army has melted away at the sight of U.S. forces. The Fallujah insurgents, meanwhile, are the same Baathist elements who want to restore the old regime that most Iraqis were glad to be rid of. In short, the Iraq war remains winnable, notwithstanding the quagmire chorus that has once again broken out in Washington.

The latest old advice, including from John Kerry, is to turn it all over to the United Nations. It's hard to know what specifically proponents mean by this, since the current U.N. presence in Baghdad consists only of political envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. If Mr. Brahimi can serve as an honest broker among Iraqi factions, then he might do some good. Then again, Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post reports that he began a meeting with the Iraqi Governing Council by declaring that he came 'as a brother Arab'--in the presence of two Kurds and a Turkoman member.

A broader U.N. mission fled Iraq the first time it was attacked last year, and only yesterday Kofi Annan ruled out sending 'a large U.N. team' for the 'foreseeable future' for security reasons. That means U.S. soldiers would still do the fighting, albeit under U.N. command. Pakistani U.N. troops sat in their barracks while Army Rangers took casualties in Mogadishu, and Dutch U.N. soldiers let the Serbs drag Bosnian men off to their deaths in the 'safe' zone they controlled in former Yugoslavia. The last thing U.S. military officers need is to have their plans for controlling Fallujah overruled by some U.N. political actor answerable to the French and Russians.

It's also far from clear that Iraqis would welcome control by the same U.N. that administered the corrupt Oil for Food program that enriched Saddam Hussein. If the price of U.N. involvement is to sweep the Oil for Food scandal under the carpet, then Iraqis would be justifiably furious.

Another Washington mistake is to see the past week as a failure of 'Iraqification.' We said long before the war that the U.S. should train and supply Iraqis opposed to Saddam, and the delay in doing that has cost us. But the Iraq Civil Defense Corps was never supposed to be a front-line force; it was formed to assist coalition troops with intelligence and other duties. The failure of one of its brigades to deploy to Fallujah is a problem that needs to be addressed at the command level, but other units have been fighting bravely. The number of pro-coalition Iraqis killed in action since September has been roughly equal to the number of Americans.

The spin in recent days that no Iraqis are willing to fight in their own cause is simply false. And some of the people now questioning the loyalty of the ICDC are the same folks who said it was a mistake to disband an Iraqi army loyal to Saddam. General John Abizaid's decision to reappoint some former Iraqi officers to ICDC leadership posts may help, but only if the choices are made carefully enough to exclude the worst Baath elements. De-Baathification was not a mistake as far as the Shiites are concerned.





After 35 years of terror, and uncertain that they can depend on the U.S. in the long run, many Iraqis are also understandably wary of speaking up too loudly or too soon. More of them will begin to do so once there is more clarity about what is going to happen when sovereignty is transferred on June 30, and especially when elections are going to be held. One reason Mr. Sadr is able to exploit Shiite fears is because no one knows when or whether there will ever be an election.
Coalition officials have been trying so hard to make sure that the Sunnis of Saddam's former strongholds feel wanted that they've risked alienating the Shiite majority. Uncertainty has only fed those fears. If even U.S. regent L. Paul Bremer can't explain what is going to happen after June 30, then no wonder Shiites who have lived in fear for decades are suspicious. More clarity about the political direction is now the most urgent need beyond security.

On the politics, by the way, the White House and Mr. Bremer would do well to look to America's own experience with federalism. One legitimate Iraqi fear is that they will be ruled again by an all-powerful central government in Baghdad. The coalition might find Iraqis in the provinces more amenable to political compromise if they control things that matter, such as having a direct claim on some Iraqi tax receipts or on U.S. reconstruction aid. It's an illusion to think, as some in the CIA and coalition headquarters still do, that the way to solve the Sunni problem is by rekindling Iraqi nationalism through control in Baghdad. Moderate Sunnis are far more likely to come around to the new reality if they see that they will have some local control.

All of this is contingent on improving security, which means winning in the Sunni Triangle and against Mr. Sadr. U.S. forces clearly have the power to do so, if they are given the authority. The Marines in Fallujah were making great progress before the recent cease-fire, rolling up terror safehouses, bomb factories and foreign fighters. Allowing a respite at the request of the Iraqi Governing Council may make sense if it wins more Iraqi support for the effort, but the reality is that the remnants of the Fedayeen and Saddam's Mukhabarat have to be killed or caught. The last thing they want is a free Iraq.





Unlike many in Washington in the past week, President Bush does not seem to be panicking. One thing we wish he'd do better is explain the realities in Iraq, and his strategy for victory, as he no doubt did at the press conference scheduled for last night after our deadline. If the November election is a referendum on Iraq, then the one sure way for Mr. Bush to lose would be to dodge the subject. Especially with the chattering classes wringing their hands or counseling retreat, Mr. Bush needs to help Americans understand why failure cannot be an option.










-you think you can take us on... you and your cronies-