1) your 60k tuition? what does that even mean?
2) you're wrong. I've studied guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) extensively; I can say with absolute certainty that the soviets would have failed in Afghanistan if the fighters there recieved zero dollars of US aid. I'm sure you've seen Charlie Wilson's War. Go ahead and forget everything you learned there. Sure, the mujahideen wouldn't have been able to shoot down the soviets' helicopters, but you can't hold territory from the air. For a relevant example, see Vietnam.
The only way to effectively wage COIN is to separate populations from insurgents, both physically and ideologically. The new Army/Marines COIN Manual reflects this, Gen. McChrystal's Commander's Initial Assessment for Afghanistan reflects this; in 1934, Maj. Stanley Utley of the USMC said this in an article in the Marine Corps Gazette. You must wage an indirect war; direct strategy and tactics are at best useless, and more often counterproductive.
The Russians, however, countered asymmetrical tactics and strategy with a conventional combat-centric approach. They attempted to kill as many insurgents as they could; this does not work. You cannot kill them all. They know their country far better than you do. They can hide in places you can't find. That includes in plain sight; they can melt away into the general population if necessary.
I've written extensively on the topic. I've linked to two papers I've written that pertain to this topic:
Unconventional Enemy; Unconventional Approach: An analysis of direct- and indirect- counterinsurgency in Malaya, Kenya, and Vietnam
A perspective on the historical development of counterinsurgency population management
theory and the relative reliance on force and influence