why the fuck not... here it is. there are a sack-load of citations that I couldn't copy but whatever~
Technological Motivations and the use of the Atomic Bomb
It began as an idea in theoretical physics and evolved into the incineration of two Japanese cities in 1945. Prior to WWII, many bombing strategists debated the feasibility of enemy capitulation with one decisive strike: in the waning days of WWII this vision became a reality. An immense technological and logistical endeavor yielded what Richard Rhodes referred to as “the largest physics experiment ever attempted up to that time.” The result of this experiment, the atomic bomb, was then rushed into action by the military and subsequently dropped not once, but twice on the Japanese enemy with hopes that the Japanese would surrender, eliminating the need for a costly invasion. The key to this decision lay not wholly in the political implications, but also in the pure technology of the bomb itself. The breath-taking science behind the bomb was one of the major factors in the decision for its use. Following such an enormous investment of time, money, intellect, and confidence by the United States government; any other option becomes something quite less. This is not to say that many of the more clear reasons for its use are incorrect, but simply that there was more to those sorties than the avoidance of an invasion. Historians would say that the scientists at Los Alamos manipulated science to achieve their ends, but at some point the technology itself began to manipulate many of the decisions involved.
It is important to first understand the most obvious political and military reasons for advocating the use of the atomic bomb on Japan. As the war in the Pacific theater progressed it became clear from a military standpoint that the Japanese would under no conditions, surrender. The problem arises with the fact that the term “Japanese” refers to both military and civilians. Within Rhode’s Trinity he refers to a quote by Curtis LeMay regarding the state of the Japanese civilian world: “All you had to do was visit one of those targets after we’d roasted it, and see the ruins of a multitude of tiny houses, with a drill press sticking up through the wreckage of every home. The entire population got into the act and worked to make those airplanes or munitions of war… men, women, children.” Whether or not each Japanese civilian was, in fact, manufacturing war materials for Japan is not the only point of this statement. Instead, it had become increasingly clear that when the time came for an invasion, each inch of Japanese soil would be extremely costly to American forces. In addition to LeMay, Stimson speculated that “there was a large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence have never yet been felt. He (Stimson) felt sure that this submerged class would fight and fight tenaciously if attacked on their own ground.” The planned invasion, Operation Olympic, called for a spearhead landing in Kyushu with early casualty estimates somewhere under 31,000. Operation Olympic would then follow with an “invasion of the Tokyo Plain.” The invasion would culminate with the occupation of Japan by U.S. forces. Many believed this invasion would be one of the costliest in U.S. History. With the memory of Operation of Overlord still fresh, many military commanders were hopefully for an alternative. The atomic bomb offered such an alternative.
From a military standpoint, the decision to use atomic weapons was largely based on the fact that these nuclear attacks would supplant the need for Operation Olympic. However, the decisions to attack Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have been rooted somewhere much earlier. As early as the 1930’s there became a keen interest among the military about the potential of military airpower, specifically in an air war with Japan: Sherry “then airmen might have to strike at it through systematic rather than selective destruction, that is, by direct attacks on the civilian population.” And additionally, “these tensions and potentialities in the theory of air power emerged more starkly in contemplation of war with Japan.” An attack on civilian targets in Japan had been, at least, mentioned far before the events of Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into WWII. The military’s fascination with the theory of air strikes bringing the enemy to its knees surely had not disappeared by 1945: “FDR shared the prevailing belief that the terror of bombing, not its actual destruction, would work a quick victory.” Additionally Harold Macmillan commented on how “We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear war today.” If, in fact, the military had come up with a vision of strategic bombing and its potential as early as 1938 this view of total annihilation certainly had not diminished through World War II. It is these early roots and perceptions of air war that the military had clung to for the years in between. Evidence can be seen in the strategic bombing campaigns in both the European and Pacific theaters. The fact remained that both campaigns had not accomplished what theorists had earlier predicted: a quick victory. However, when a weapon capable of fulfilling the earliest predictions of a decisive strike became available, the military had already made such an investment that there were few other options. It is this fascination with a weapon system’s abilities, both technological and political, that will later be seen in many of the Los Alamos scientists upon the completion of the atomic bomb.
In order to understand how the technology involved in the atomic bomb shaped the decision for its use, the technology itself must be examined. Additionally, the scale of the entire Manhattan project must also be looked at carefully when attempting to understand the decisions regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the outset of the project, the scientists involved, namely Oppenheimer, dictated what would be required in order to perform the necessary experiments and tests of such a theoretical weapon. The amount of time and money needed would not be known until a much later date, but according to Goldberg, “the project would mount to twenty times the November 1941 estimate of $133 million.” What makes this investment even more formidable was the fact that, from the beginning, the actual results of the scientists’ theories could not be known. In reference to the idea of an atomic weapon: “This seems to be as sure as any untried prediction based upon theory and experiment can be.” If the government was willing to subsidize this project at such a financial level even without any sort of guarantee alludes to the United States’ strong desire to possess such a decisive weapons system above all else. This early investment not only assured that the project would proceed, but also that its possible result would be utilized to change the war. In addition to the financial scale of the project, the technology of the bomb itself was somewhat larger than life. For example; in order to initiate fission a plethora of scarce materials would be required; most notably uranium and from it plutonium. The idea of separating these isotopes had not been previously considered, as seen by the extremely scarce nature of the material. “By the fall of 1941 there had been no convincing laboratory demonstrations of isotope separation.” Within two years the scientists at Los Alamos were able to go from a state where almost nothing was known of the process, to perfecting and industrializing it on a scale previously unheard of. Accomplishments like these compiled with the awesome nature of the weapon held a certain power over those involved. The separation of plutonium was not the only engineering problem that Oppenheimer and the Los Alamos scientists had to overcome. In addition to procuring the material, the scientists had to devise a way to most efficiently initiate the chain reaction so as to conserve the materials, and yield the largest energy release. Early designs were quite primitive and certainly not the most efficient method of compacting the material: “The target sphere could be simply welded to the muzzle of a cannon; then the cylinder, which might weigh about a hundred pounds, could be fired up the barrel like a shell.” There were skeptics among the group that questioned whether or not this method would take full advantage of the volatile material. One experimental physicist, Seth Neddermeyer, considered the benefits of “spherically symmetric shock waves” as opposed to the somewhat linear cannon approach. Dr. Oppenheimer argued that Neddermeyer’s idea would culminate in something similar to blowing “’in a beer can without splattering the beer’. Implosion was even harder to do than that.” The fact is that the scientists were able to overcome many such obstacles that would have been even theoretically impossible just a few years ago. With each technical hurdle that the Los Alamos team cleared, it added another level of brilliance and accomplishment to the weapon; and in some cases ignited the flames of technological fanaticism. This enthusiasm and fervor for the successful completion of the project would carry its momentum beyond the completion of the weapon, and into the heart of Japan.
Michael Sherry links an interesting concept to his review and history of American air power: technological fanaticism. It is this concept that ties the scientific and military proponents of the use of the atomic bomb. Sherry describes this fanaticism as “a pursuit of destructive ends expressed, sanctioned, and disguised by the organization and application of technological means.” Sherry is careful to point out that “Destruction was rarely the acknowledged final purpose for the men who made air war possible.” Likewise, destruction was rarely the acknowledged final purpose for the men who made nuclear war possible. It was the technology of the weapons and the air corps that pushed the leaders to utilize both to their full potential. Before characterizing the Los Alamos team as “pro nuclear war” it is important to note that following a survey of the involved scientists, only 23 out of 150 participants voted that the military “use the weapons in the manner that is from the military point of view most effective in bringing about prompt Japanese surrender at minimum cost to our armed forces.” This reluctance to use the weapon in the field certainly did not stem the scientists from pursuing their goal at an unbelievable pace. It is possible that many of the scientists did not see the connection between their work, and the possible consequences, but as the Trinity test approached debate over the weapon’s use subsided while the scientists worked to complete the apparatus. It is a distinct possibility that the Trinity test was simply a confirmation of what the military had planned for the atomic bomb in Japan. “At 0836 Pacific War Time, four hours after the light flung from the Jornado del Muerto blanched the face of the moon, the Indianapolis sailed with its cargo under the Golden Gate and out to sea.” In many ways the deployment of the atomic bomb to the Pacific theater was an extension of the weapons testing. The target choices confirmed this belief that the atomic bomb was once again being “tested”. For example the selection of Hiroshima as a target city was no random act: “the targets chosen should be places the bombing of which would most adversely affect the will of the Japanese people to continue the war. Beyond that, they should be military in nature.” followed by “Hiroshima is the largest untouched target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list. Consideration should be given to this city.” Relative to other possible targets, one cannot classify an airburst over downtown Hiroshima as an attack on a “military target”. Additionally, it is important to note that the planners chose the least damaged city as their target. This choice could mean that those in charge wished to further “test” these weapons and observe what results could be yielded in terms of casualties and the destruction of an otherwise intact city. In this case, the military decision makers were affected by their own breed of technological fanaticism: they continued to pursue their destructive means while focusing more intently on the technological abilities of their weapon.
A number of other scientists (46%) and politicians voiced their opinion for a technical demonstration; the infeasible nature of which further confirmed the relative lack of options concerning what the United States should do with the atomic bomb. A military demonstration became problematic when carefully examined as an viable option. First of all, the unpredictable nature of the early atomic weapons caused serious problems when considered for a demonstration with hopes of a Japanese surrender; “if the bomb then failed to explode, certainly we would have given aid and comfort to the Japanese militarists. Thereafter, the Japanese people probably would not be impressed by any statement we might make in the hope of inducing them to surrender.” Additionally, the thought of transporting such a weapon onto enemy soil for a demonstration raises serious questions regarding security of both the personnel involved, and the technology of the weapon. Essentially, the lack of feasible alternatives further narrowed the decision whether or not to use the atomic bombs.
The final factor that made the United States’ use of the atomic bomb even less surprising was the racial prejudice that was so prevalent throughout the entire process. From the earliest paranoia regarding Japan as a threat: “For Mitchell, war against the ‘yellow military peril’ seemed easy and inviting.” and “Destruction would be total, not selective.” Even years before Pearl Harbor, Americans such as Mitchell had no reservations when considering such a method of warfare in Japan. Some of the more startling evidence followed the use of the bombs. Specifically, dialogue regarding the victims and the types of wounds suffered one military doctor remarked that “The thing is these people got good and burned – good thermal burns.” Typically when referencing a civilian injury, such as a burn, the terminology rarely centers on how “good” a particular burn is. These views were not restricted to the home front; much of the intense fighting in the Pacific had been fueled by ethnic differences on both sides. Following the war, a survey regarding post-war treatment of the Japanese revealed that 53% of participants felt that the U.S. should “strictly control” the Japanese people and “punish war criminals.”22 Beneath the technological and political motivations, the racial rift perceived by the United States military lent further support to the use of the atomic bombs.
The primary reason for the nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki centered on the idea of saving American soldiers from a bloody invasion of Japan, “invasion would take ‘500,000 to 1,000,000 lives’”23 However, upon further examination of the decision itself technological fanaticism and racial differences played important secondary roles in the alternative to invasion. From the airmen’s point of view, the ability to reduce thousands of sorties to one singular bomb appealed deeply to their desire to advance their tactics and position in the military world. The atomic bomb offered the military something they had theorized about for years. When the weapon was complete, there was little else the military planned to do with the weapon. In the case of the scientists involved at Los Alamos, the bomb itself had taken a hold on not only their lives, but their decision-making as well. The technology involved in the atomic bomb was at such an unprecedented level, that it became hard for even the most brilliant physicists not to marvel at its sheer scale in the physical world. If one were to say that the technology involved in the atomic bomb had risen above human level and scale, then perhaps this is why it was able to take such a hold on those most closely involved. By the time the Trinity test had sunk in for the scientists the bomb, and more specifically the technology involved, had already begun determining its own destiny. Combine this with the investment put forth by the United States government; “The amount actually spent between June 1942 and August 1945 exceeded $2 billion.”24, and the situation further clarifies itself. The decision regarding use of atomic weapons had been made before the weapons even existed in the physical world.
